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ABSTRACT. Organizations are exposed to increasing
pressures from their constituents to integrate corporate
social responsibility (CSR) principles into their ongoing
business practices. But accepting new and potentially
open-ended commitments is not a harmless exercise, and
companies may well expose themselves to serious risks
when embracing such principles. To identify these risks,
we conducted two naturalistic studies: one exploratory,
the other corroborative. The results show that CSR
adoption is associated with at least seven different business
risks, ranging from failing strategy implementation to
legitimacy destruction. To alleviate these risks, we discuss
a set of managerial mitigation strategies that have the
potential to realign companies’ CSR activities with their
strategic objectives.
KEY WORDS: corporate social responsibility, corporate
social responsibility risks, managerial implications,
mitigation strategies, strategy implementation, Trojan
horses
Risks without returns?
The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
refers to organizational conduct that proactively
integrates the voice of parties affected by business
activities in corporate decision-making (e.g. Carroll
and Hoy, 1984; Heugens et al., 2002; Hosmer,
1994). This type of conduct typically reaches beyond
the firm’s economic and legal obligations (Carroll,
1979; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), in order to
satisfy and sometimes exceed its stakeholders’
expectations (Clarkson, 1995; Husted, 2000). Of
central concern to the socially responsible firm is the
potential contribution of its CSR activities to its
competitive advantage. From a strategic point of
view (cf. Lantos, 2001), CSR involves ‘‘the firm’s
plan to allocate resources in order to achieve long-
term social objectives and create competitive
advantage’’ (Husted and Allen, 2000: 25). The
strategic lens thus urges us to consider the possibility
that investments in CSR activities are deliberately
undertaken to enhance the competitiveness of
business organizations (Keim, 1978).
Yet, investments in CSR involve relatively irre-
versible commitments, which can easily backfire in
the form of negative effects on the company’s com-
petitiveness and competitive positioning (Rugman
and Verbeke, 1998). Companies are in especially
grave danger when they adopt a low-effort CSR-
profile (Stevens et al., 2005), when they do not free
up sufficient managerial capacity to manage CSR
activities rigorously (Bansal, 2005), or when their
investment triggers the interest of previously
dormant stakeholder groups (Buysse and Verbeke,
2003). Hence, we portray CSR activities as a Trojan
horse that must be tamed by managers before they
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can reap any benefit of their investments. Our main
ambition is to systematically identify different types
of corporate social responsibility risk, which we define
here as any unintended pressure on a firm that occurs
as a side-effect to its acceptance of social obligations
beyond its legal and economic responsibilities.
Prior literature on CSR risks
The CSR literature generally favors corporate
engagement in CSR activities. Many CSR scholars
point out that companies can have a significant
impact on alarming social and environmental
developments (Starik and Marcus, 2000). Indicative
are the numerous discussions by CSR scholars of
corporate scandals (such as Enron, WorldCom, and
Parmalat) and environmental disasters (such as
Chernobyl, Bhopal, and Exxon Valdez). In addition,
contested industries (such as alcohol, gambling, to-
bacco, chemicals, petroleum, and nuclear energy)
and morally questionable activities (such as bribery,
child labor, and sexual or racial discrimination) are
also ‘‘usual suspects’’ in the CSR literature. It has
been emphasized that if companies indeed cause
harm to people and the natural environment, we
should aim to find a solution to this problem. Nobel
laureate Ronald Coase (1960) has argued that such
solutions can materialize in three alternate ways. The
first solution relies on the market mechanism, so that
the ‘invisible hand’ will discipline those causing
harm to others. The second solution is oriented
toward the reorganization of business activities in a
way that internalizes the problem, so that the exis-
tence of unpriced negative externalities will be
minimized. A third solution may be provided by the
government, through regulatory action aimed at the
prevention or minimization of harmful activities.
In spite of this relatively broad range of alterna-
tives, the CSR literature tends to focus on only one
of these solutions, i.e. the reorganization of business
activities to the point where companies will promote
‘social good’ and prevent ‘social harm’ (Fitch, 1976;
Wells, 1998). The market and government solutions
were regarded as inferior from the very beginning of
CSR theorizing. The CSR literature emerged as a
criticism of the neoclassical theory of economic
growth (Wartick and Cochran, 1985), which pos-
tulates that companies should maximize their profits
(Friedman, 1970). This neoclassical contention is
indeed based on the presumption that market forces
and governments (as a last resort) will address
harmful activities. But the CSR idea opposes this
contention from the perspective that harmful busi-
ness activities are still regularly observed in capitalist
markets regulated by democratically elected gov-
ernments. Another often-used argument is the
dramatically increased power of multinational com-
panies, which possibly aligns corporate preferences
with the law through corruption and lobbying (e.g.
Hertz, 2001). Overall, the CSR literature advocates
the reorganization of corporate activities as the most
appropriate solution to alarming social and envi-
ronmental developments. Moreover, companies are
urged to invest in CSR activities permanently, and
not only when they cause harm.
The preference of CSR scholars for business-
driven solutions to the problem of social cost (Coase,
1960) helps us understand CSR’s resonance with the
corporate world. However, too little attention has
been paid to the managerial consequences and
especially the negative organizational effects of
embracing CSR principles (Dentchev, 2004).
Although the relationship between corporate social
performance (CSP) and corporate financial perfor-
mance (CFP) is extensively studied in the CSR field
(e.g. Margolis and Walsh, 2001, 2003), it remains
rather elusive as some studies report a positive rela-
tionship, while others report no relationship, and still
others report a negative relationship. In retrospect,
Margolis and Walsh (2003) argue that the search for
a positive CSP – CFP link is an attempt to show the
superiority of CSR theory compared to its rival
theory, the neoclassical theory of economic growth.
Attempts along these lines can explain the limited
attention paid to CSR risks.
There are at least three prior indications in the
literature that provide endorsement for the project of
CSR risk identification. First, the potential for
negative effects of CSR adoption on firm competi-
tiveness is occasionally referenced in the argumen-
tation for research hypotheses (e.g. Margolis and
Walsh, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Second,
these negative effects may have a theoretical expla-
nation. Keim (1978) describes CSR activities as
‘investments’ in a public good. This means that
while one party allocates resources, everyone
(competitors included) can enjoy the benefits of
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improved public services. Third, prior empirical
studies appear to suggest the existence of CSR risks.
Bowman and Haire (1975) found an inversed-
U-relationship between corporate social perfor-
mance and financial performance. More recently,
Husted and Allen (2004) found a negative relation-
ship between one widely accepted CSR character-
istic (volunteerism) and the value creation of firms.
A more systematic assessment of CSR risks thus
seems appropriate. We thus conducted two natu-
ralistic studies (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) to capture
the broadest possible variety of risks. The first is an
exploratory study that enabled us to identify seven
CSR risks. To cast our nets as widely as possible, we
interviewed 18 European experts with quite varied
stances on CSR. This research strategy is consistent
with received views in strategic management that
individuals are likely to interpret issues from the
standpoint of their own interests (Dutton and
Webster, 1988), prior experiences (Daft and Weick,
1984), and functional level in the organization
(Heugens, 2005). We then designed a second, cor-
roborative study to test whether these findings
would also hold in a corporate setting. This study
involves the case of the CSR policy and perfor-




For the first study we employed the grounded the-
ory method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) to uncover
various CSR risks. Grounded theory is a research
method that allows much flexibility when collecting
and interpreting the data. Consequentially, when
using this method the researcher must ‘‘specify quite
explicitly upon what kinds of data his interpretation
rests’’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 233). Specifically,
we used interviews with 18 European CSR experts
as our primary source of data (see Table I). We
selected experts primarily on the basis of their
knowledge of and experience with CSR.
The sampling logic we followed was that of the
most different systems design (Przeworski and
Teune, 1970), including respondents with widely
different institutional affiliations – e.g., academic
institutions, business networks, NGOs, and labor
unions. We asked these respondents what dangers
they foresaw for companies seeking involvement
with CSR. We took detailed notes during the
interviews, and we wrote detailed interview reports
immediately after each research conversation. As
indicated before each interview, we sent our infor-
mants an electronic version of the interview report
by e-mail, usually within a week, and asked them to
review these notes. This typically resulted in a few
minor corrections per interview, which increased
the accuracy of our observations.
Results
Seven risks associated with CSR investments were
identified. Four of these risks – diluting managerial
attention, non-productive spending, stretching the
organizational coalition, and bad strategy imple-
mentation – play out at the organizational level of
analysis (see Figure 1). They (a) refer to organiza-
tional insiders, and their impact is (b) most likely to
be felt inside the organization, (c) more likely to be
substantive than symbolic, and (d) prone to influ-
encing internal coordination and governance
mechanisms. In contrast, the remaining three risks –
legitimacy destruction, issue ownership, and poor
risk communication – are located at the interorga-
nizational level of analysis (see Figure 1). The latter
(a) primarily refer to persons and groups that are
outside the (dominant) organizational coalition, and
their impact is (b) most likely to be felt in the in-
terorganizational networks in which the company
participates, (c) more likely to be symbolic than
substantive, and (d) prone to influencing the orga-
nization’s externally construed legitimacy, reputa-
tional standing, and social capital. Both groups of
CSR risks are likely interrelated, however, as
problems in the organizational management of CSR
activities can provide negative signals to internal as
well as external stakeholders. We proceed with a
brief discussion of these seven risks.
Diluting managerial attention
In an interview with the network coordinator of
Trivisi, a foundation sponsored by the Flemish
government to stimulate the adoption of CSR
practices, the following concern was raised:
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E1:
1To embrace the principles of CSR implies that
firms not only acknowledge and embrace eco-
nomic and financial values, but also social,
societal, and environmental values. What really
matters is that one at least acknowledges all





























1 Trivisi Network coordinator
2 ABVV (Labor-union) Head of education department
3 Ghent University Professor of sustainable development
4 Koning Boudewijnstichting Network coordinator
5 Flanders Network for Business Ethics Network coordinator
6 Ghent University Associate professor in environmental economics
7 Ghent University Assistant professor in environmental economics
8 Catholic University of Louvain Professor of sustainable development
9 Vlerick Leuven Ghent
Management School
Senior research assistant in corporate
social performance
10 Catholic University of Louvain Professor of business ethics
11 Kauri Network coordinator
12 Greenpeace (NGO) Executive director
13 Vlerick Leuven Ghent
Management School
Senior research assistant in corporate
social performance
14 Business and Society Belgium Network coordinator
15 Ethibel (Consultancy bureau
for ethical investment)
Executive director
16 UNIZO (Syndicate of entrepreneurs) Head of education department
17 Antwerp University Full professor in sustainable development
18 Bond Beter Leefmilieu
(umbrella of environmentalist
organizations)
Integral product policy advisor
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firm. (...) But the primary reason of being in
business is to turn a profit. The real danger of
CSR is that one loses sight of the commercial
strategy. It is perfectly conceivable that an
enthusiastic firm begins to orient itself primarily
to the pursuit of social and ecological goals,
even if economical aspects are its primary
purpose.
From a managerial portfolio perspective, CSR rep-
resents a novel activity that demands managerial
attention and that siphons off scarce managerial
resources from the company’s core productive
activities. We therefore suggest:
Proposition 1: The adoption of CSR activities
involves the risk of spreading managerial
resources too thin over a larger number of
investment alternatives.
Non-productive spending
In an interview with a Senior Research Assistant
active in CSR at Vlerick Management School
(Belgium’s leading business school), the following
concern was raised:
E9: To us, the definition of CSR is closely related
to stakeholder management (...) In our view,
the most important aspect of running a business
is to define and implement the corporate
strategy, and this is a matter of anticipating and
responding to stakeholder behavior (...) But in
the CSR field, a thousand-and-one definitions,
terms, and interpretations exist as to what CSR
is and ought to be. When firms do not get a
clear signal about the true nature of CSR, about
what firms must do to live up to its principles,
and how one can reach a more responsible
steady state of operations (...) investments in
CSR amount to nothing but costs, reputational
risks, and wasted time. (...) If you take the so-
called Triple Bottom Line as an example, in
which not one but three ultimate goals are
suggested for the firm, such an exercise is
bound to generate internal tensions. Tensions
that weren’t there before, and that cannot be
resolved.
The issue at stake is that CSR activities are at least
partially investments in public goods (Keim, 1978).
While no one can deny the value of, say, cleaner
air or societal stability, the production of these
goods tends to go hand-in-hand with problems of
collective action. Any company making significant
investments in such goods without gaining and
enforcing the commitment of relevant competitors
is likely to suffer in factor, capital, and product
markets (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2001). Hence we
propose:
Proposition 2: The adoption of CSR activities
involves the risk of spending resources unpro-
ductively on goals that encourage free-riding
behavior in stakeholders.
Stretching the organizational coalition
The following threat of CSR implementation was
raised in an interview with another Senior Research
Assistant active in CSR at Vlerick:
E13: The CSR approach is laden with normative
assumptions and prescriptions. Yet these are
not all innocent or harmless. CSR principles
state that firms must integrate the interests of
their stakeholders into the day-to-day deci-
sions that they make. Not just those of the most
powerful stakeholders, but also those of parties
that are merely influenced by the enterprise
(...) But I foresee great danger for any enter-
prise that allows its business policy to be dic-
tated by its external constituents. This
‘‘management by stakeholders’’ entails such a
democratic concept of governance that it can
easily lead to total anarchy.
The behavioral theory of the firm holds that orga-
nizations can be perceived of as a ‘‘coalition’’
involving many dissimilarly interested parties (Cyert
and March, 1963). One of the foremost challenges
facing organizations is providing these parties with
adequate inducements to safeguard their contribu-
tions. By engaging in CSR practices, firms effec-
tively broaden the scope of their coalition. This puts
greater pressure on the organization to provide the
appropriate incentives (cf. Prahalad and Bettis, 1986,
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1995), and one of the unwanted consequences of
CSR might be that primary stakeholders, like buyers
and suppliers, lose interest in the firm if it no longer
serves their basic needs. Therefore, we argue:
Proposition 3: The adoption of CSR activities
involves the risk of broadening an organization’s
coalition beyond a feasible set.
Bad strategy implementation
When we asked one of the associate professors at
Ghent University about the potential risks of CSR,
we received the following response:
R6: The successful implementation of ongoing
continuous improvement trajectories in the
area of environmental management, or in the
broader area of quality control, can become
obstructed if we have to wait for the new
concept to crystallize (...) One of the most
important factors holding back the successful
implementation of CSR activities is the lack of
usable performance indicators (...) we simply
have no good measures to evaluate the actual
infusion of CSR principles in a business. It then
becomes a very difficult concept to measure,
and on top of that it will become very hard to
obtain some degree of consensus concerning
the future implementation of the integral CSR
concept.
Involvement in CSR activities has almost acquired the
status of a new ‘‘generic strategy’’ (Porter, 1980).
Organizations presently seek a sustainable competitive
advantage by controlling their costs, by differentiating
their products from those of competitors, or by
adopting a corporate image in which the company as a
whole is portrayed as more responsible, aware, and
responsive to the needs of a broader group of orga-
nizational stakeholders (Heugens et al., 2003). But
good strategy selection must be followed up by good
strategy implementation (e.g. Bourgeois and Brodwin,
1984). This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 4: The adoption of CSR activities
increases the risk of bad strategy implementation
when pivotal stakeholders are turned off by the
difficulties of measuring the successfulness of a
CSR-based strategy.
Legitimacy destruction
We obtained the following response from one of the
full professors at Ghent University about possible
perils of CSR:
E3: The concept of CSR sails under many colors,
and the question is how this diversity manifests
itself within the firm. At the very least, we
expect some heightened attention to the inte-
gration of economic, social, and ecological
aspects in the ongoing policies of the firm (...)
But dilution and the abuse of the concept
lower the credibility of the firm. That is why I
favor the verification of CSR reports and
communications by third parties; otherwise
there is a great risk that such activities will be
perceived as attempts at window dressing.
Certain companies are perceived of as being illegit-
imate by default. Actors in contested industries often
find that the adoption of CSR-related activities does
not automatically lead to a better corporate reputa-
tion or public image (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).
Instead, CSR investments by companies in, say, the
petrochemical, defense, and tobacco industries are
often greeted with cynicism, and lead to legitimacy
destruction rather than build-up. Thus:
Proposition 5: The adoption of CSR activities
increases the risk of lowering organizational
legitimacy, because it can easily be mistaken for
a signal that the organization has to compensate
for some misconduct.
Issue ownership
When we asked the network coordinator of Kauri –
a Flemish platform supporting sustainable interna-
tional entrepreneurship – for his opinion on the
potential risks of CSR, he gave us a surprisingly
candid answer:
E11: Companies must remain companies! They
must not try to ‘‘save the world,’’ and they
must not seek to take over the task of other
institutions like government, NGOs, or civil
society. They simply must perform the tasks
they are supposed to perform responsibly (...)
Corporate social responsibility does not mean
that management must play every conceivable
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part. Running a company simply means
marketing high-quality products (...) One of
the great dangers of everything that is being
said and written about CSR is that people are
beginning to see companies as ‘‘mini socie-
ties.’’ It seems like other groups are shifting
the responsibility for resolving every con-
ceivable issue that bothers them towards
corporate actors. But a company is a com-
pany, and we may not overstretch our
expectations of them.
CSR investments do not occur in a social vacuum,
but rather in an embedded setting in which many
actors are aware of the decisions made by others. In
such settings, a company’s involvement with certain
social problems or issues is likely to be perceived as
an information signal (Dentchev and Heene, 2004)
that testifies to that company’s responsibilities with
respect to the issue. Issue-related investments can
thus easily lead to issue ownership. Therefore:
Proposition 6: The adoption of CSR activities
heightens the awareness of a firm’s audiences of
linkages between the firm and certain societal is-
sues, thus increasing the firm’s perceived respon-
sibility for resolving such issues.
Poor risk communication
An assistant professor at Ghent University pointed us
in the direction of the following CSR-related risk:
E7: CSR has to be implemented consistently,
strategically, with a good communication
plan (...) Its essential utility is that, by making
investments in CSR activities, the firm can
mitigate certain uncertainties that are bound
to occur in the future. Prevent confronta-
tions, foresee abrupt changes, handle crises
involving stakeholders (...) But to have this
effect, CSR must be embedded in adequate
corporate communications. The firm can be
confronted with diametrically opposed per-
ceptions of what it does effectively and what
not, or what goals it should continue to
pursue and which it should lay to rest. But
CSR always needs an adequate communica-
tions campaign; if you fail to communicate
with the outside world, CSR will always be
perceived as a public relations campaign. To
allow the emergence of such misunderstand-
ings means that you will miss out on all long-
term opportunities (...) it means that all your
sincere efforts will be seen as instrumental,
shallow public relations exercises.
A final concern with CSR-activities is that they
may stir up latent concerns amongst consumers
and citizens. Corporate communication concern-
ing certain issues may well bring issues to the
active attention of individuals, where they were
only perceived subliminally at first. Furthermore,
the association of a company name with certain
social or environmental issues, no matter how
intelligently or carefully communicated, may stir
up a plethora of unwanted side effects. In this
context, we formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 7: The adoption of CSR activities
can increase the risks outsiders perceive to be
exposed to, especially if firms fail to communi-
cate about their motives for adopting CSR
practices in ways that cohere with outside
audiences.
Study 2 – organization
Method
The purpose of the second study was to investigate
whether the CSR risks identified in the first had any
relevance in a business setting. We therefore adopted
the case study methodology (Flyvbjerg, 2004;
Gerring, 2004), focusing on the Health, Safety and
Environment (HSE) policy and performance (as a
proxy for CSR adoption) of a leading multinational
firm in the petrochemical industry. Further indica-
tors of the company’s commitment to CSR are its:
(a) inclusion in indexes like the Dow Jones Sus-
tainable Performance Group, the FTSE4GOOD
Indexes, and Fortune Reputation Index; (b)
endorsement of the Global Sullivan Principles; (c)
membership of CSR Europe; and (d) participation in
the CAUX Round Table.
In all, we interviewed 27 respondents over a
four-month period. Of these, 22 were employees
of the company (with respondents ranging from
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top-management to the shop floor level) and five
external stakeholders (see Table II). The face-to-
face interviews addressed questions about the
purpose, organization, and impact on competi-
tiveness (positive or negative) of the company’s
HSE activities.
We used a number of commonly recommended
procedures to ensure the quality of our data work.
We aimed to increase the reliability of our findings
by carefully documenting our data collection
procedures and organizing our interview notes in
an NVivo project database (cf. Yin, 1994). As in
the first study, we took detailed notes and asked
our respondents to verify an e-mailed version. We
also used two tactics to ensure the construct valid-
ity of this study, i.e. the correspondence
between the operational measures in use and the
theoretical concepts they are supposed to repre-
sent (George and Bennett, 2004): (1) triangulation
of data collection methods (interviews, internal
documents, and media reports), and (2) verifica-
tion of the case study report by three employees
of the petrochemical company, who judged the
accuracy of the data collected, though not its
conclusions.
Results
We analyzed the data gathered in this study against
the background of our propositions, finding modest
to strong corroborative support for them. We first
constructed a 7 by 27 coding matrix by juxtaposing
our research propositions and our company
TABLE II
Company interviewees
# Level of analysis Function
1 Policy-group level Executive VP Technology, Portfolio &
Sustainable Development
2 Policy-group level Executive VP Operational Excellence
3 Policy-group level HSE Strategy and Communication
4 Policy-group level Issues Manager
5 Execution-group level Business Development Manager
6 Execution-group level Sales Manager
7 Execution-group level Issues Manager
8 Advisory-group level Sustainable Development coordinator
9 Advisory-group level Manager new developments logistics
10 Advisory-group level HSE advisor
11 Policy-operational level Plant Manager
12 Policy-operational level Manager Technology
13 Policy-operational level Manager Health Safety Environment Quality
14 Policy-operational level Manufacturing Manager
15 Advisory-operational level Environmental advisor
16 Advisory-operational level Environmental technologist
17 Advisory-operational level Factory operations instructor
18 Advisory-operational level Factory operations instructor
19 Execution-operational level Operator
20 Execution-operational level Operator
21 Execution-operational level Operator
22 Execution-operational level Operator
23 External stakeholder Chief Complaints Department, Local Government
24 External stakeholder Member of the Neighborhood Council
25 External stakeholder Project manager, Contractor
26 External stakeholder NGO representative
27 External stakeholder Sales Manager, Transport Company
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interviewees (see Table III). We then carefully
coded each of our interview reports, again using
NVivo software, generating an entry into the coding
matrix each time a respondent mentioned or
described one of the aforementioned CSR risks.
Occasionally a respondent reported multiple inci-
dences of a given CSR risk, which were then
cumulated in the appropriate cell. Coding matrices
like the one presented here are often used in the
quasi-statistical approach to qualitative data analysis
(cf. Becker and Geer, 1960). Their purpose is to
complement the illustrative value of individual
respondents’ quotes with a systematic representation
of the broader patterns in the data.
Diluting managerial attention
We found only a modest degree of support for the
idea that CSR activities dilute managerial attention
(2 out of 27 interviewees acknowledged the risk),
but the examples we did find were quite telling. We
asked one of the company’s HSE Strategy & Com-
munication advisors what resources were spent on
HSE:
O3:
2In short, people and money. We have 200
HSE professionals and 1000 employed in
positions that are critical to HSE. This is our
internal people resource. (...) The capital
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9 1 1 1
10 1 1
11 1 1 1 1
12 1 1 1
13 1 2
14 1 1 1
15 1 1 1
16 1 3 2
17 2
18 1 2 1 2
19 1 1
20
21 3 1 1
22 1
23 1 1
24 3 1 2
25 1 4 1
26 1 1 2
27 1
Tot 2/27 6/27 7/27 15/27 10/27 15/27 11/27
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improvement. (...) Anyway, it is hundreds of
millions of dollars. (...) We are prepared to
comply with everyone’s wishes, but at the
end of the day, we have to know what our
business is. I dare to say that the expectations
of regulators are generally met. But there are
stakeholders that deliberately take up such
positions that we won’t meet their expecta-
tions. (...) An NGO like Greenpeace just
wants us to improve, but not to meet their
expectations. If we tried to meet their stan-
dards, we would simply price ourselves out of
the market.
Similarly, when we probed one of company’s Fac-
tory Operations Instructors about how HSE
expenditure and overall profitability are balanced,
we got the following response:
O18: I have no idea how we actually manage to
balance HSE expenditure and overall profit-
ability. Probably they simply have a certain
budget for that. When we are building a new
plant, it should be as safe as possible, but at
the same time affordable. There must be
some kind of distribution key.
We: But what would your reaction be if more
people were allocated to HSE?
O18: It’s OK as long as they don’t bother me with
questions! [Laughing] No really, I have no
idea of how much people they need in that
department. My feeling is that they already
have a lot of people, and that they should be
able to make do with them. These people also
have to be managed, and money must still
come from production. (...) What I see and
hear is that the company is doing well, but we
should be careful. My feeling is that we’re
doing too much on HSE.
We thus find (some) corroborating evidence that
CSR activities are seen as a drain on managerial
resources, and that more investments would spread
managerial attention too thin.
Non-productive spending
Our study yielded moderate support for Proposition
2, with 6 out of 27 respondents referring to the
danger of ‘‘wasting’’ organizational resources on
irretrievable CSR investments. Our respondents
tended to describe CSR-related spending as ‘‘costs’’
rather than ‘‘investments.’’ CSR expenditures indeed
have an opportunity cost, in the sense that every
dollar spent on CSR cannot be invested in other
revenue-generating activities. One of the company’s
New Development Logistics managers shared his
perception of extant resource allocation patterns:
O9: To come back to what I have said, quality has its
price. If we wouldn’t invest in HSE, we
wouldn’t sell so many products. (...) We sell
because customers regard us as a secure supplier.
You have to spend on HSE to be profitable. But
you have to be careful, because it costs you
money, and spending too much could turn the
business unprofitable. You know, it is a pro-
gressive exponential function, whereas in the
beginning you can achieve much with rela-
tively low investments, but later on you end up
spending enormous amounts for just a marginal
improvement. And then customers still have to
be prepared to buy your product. Customers
have their cost limits, and our product should
not exceed those.
A related problem is that CSR expenditures can also
lead to productivity-destroying organizational rou-
tines. Many CSR expenditures crystallize in the
form of prescriptive statements such as new organi-
zational rules or standard operating procedures.
Unfortunately, these routines often tend to result in
higher bureaucratic costs for the organization itself
and for many of its stakeholders:
O25: Another example involves a subcontractor of
ours, who never wants to work for this
company again. A truck driver lost his foot-
ing on a piece of surface that had somehow
gotten a little slippery. The guy did not even
fall, but a safety inspector caught a glance of
him rubbing his leg afterwards. Incredible,
but the guy was then urged to report to the
first-aid worker on duty at that plant, and was
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subsequently taken to the doctor at a small
industry town some 15 miles away from the
plant. And afterwards they still ran him
trough an entire mill of formalities; simply an
entire day lost for nothing. This company
should simply stop acting as a moral crusader,
or we are undoubtedly headed for more
clashes with them.
In short, CSR spending tends to come with a
number of productivity-diminishing side effects.
Stretching the organizational coalition
We found moderate support for our third proposi-
tion, as 7 out of 27 respondents referred to dangers
related to an expanded coalition of decision makers.
The following example derives from a group-level
sales manager:
We: But what is your feeling: have all stakeholder
expectations been met?
O6: It’s really only my feeling, but I cannot prove
it with hard data. Their expectations are
broadly met. People have high expectations
and I observe that they are generally satisfied.
But more than that I cannot say or prove. (...)
It is difficult to judge. There are so many
segments and sub-segments in society. The
demand for information, and the quality of
information we provide over the Internet
could be good measures to answer this ques-
tion. (...) Yet I doubt whether any change in
our strategy would lead to more positive
stakeholder reactions across the board. Given
the diversity of stakeholders and of their
interests, I would doubt whether we could
ever satisfy all of our stakeholders at one time.
But if you take the word ‘‘all’’ out of your
question, then I would probably say ‘‘yes.’’
Virtually every company has a few ‘‘unbridgeable’’
stakeholders in its stakeholder set (Heugens et al.,
2002). These are parties whose interests are so
diametrically opposed to those of the focal orga-
nization, that the chances that the organization
will ever meet their expectations are really quite
slim (Heugens and van Oosterhout, 2002). The
Executive Vice President of Operational Excel-
lence illustrated the difficulty of dealing with such
parties:
O2: Some stakeholders expect perfect perfor-
mance, no emissions, or even that we quit our
business as to leave no ecological footprint at
all. Well, let me tell you that it is extremely
hard to have a conversation with that last
group of stakeholders. Some stakeholders take
up the position that everything we tell is a lie.
They will always say: ‘‘you tell us one thing,
and then do another,’’ and that offers dim
possibilities for a constructive conversation.
We struggle to bring such parties into the fold,
for example by seeking external verification
for everything we are saying.
We: How do you manage these difficulties?
O2: Our external affairs people manage them. One
part of their job is to engage in a conversation
with groups to see where we have a common
ground and where we have extremely differ-
ent views. (...) Occasionally you also have to
cope with some unintended consequences.
Doing a better job to meet the expectations of
one stakeholder might make some matters
worse for another. Overinvestment in envi-
ronmental affairs, for example, might not
make shareholders and customers happy.
In sum, when companies seek to add CSR com-
ponents to their corporate strategy, the core ques-
tions they must address are: (a) how can they satisfy
the demands of certain stakeholders in the organi-
zational coalition without losing the support of
others, and (b) how should they deal with stake-
holders whose demands are so contradictory to those
of the organization that they categorically refuse to
become part of the organizational coalition?
Bad strategy implementation
Our second study yielded an overwhelming degree
of support for the bad strategy implementation view,
as no less than 15 out of 27 respondents made
unsolicited remarks concerning the risk of losing
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employee support, or of not getting it in the first
place. An interview with a Business Development
Manager illustrates as much:
O5: Yes, we indeed introduced safety improve-
ments for employees and there was quite some
resistance. They thought that those measures
were not necessary. Besides, they perceived
that wearing that equipment could send a
negative signal to customers. We have some
work to do on the employee perception.
In an interview with one of the company’s Envi-
ronmental Advisors, a similar concern was raised.
Here, we find evidence of an unfortunate mismatch
between the (international) organizational policy of a
multinational and the national culture in one of its
dominant (national) subsidiaries:
O15: Last year we sent to employees ‘cards’ that
they were supposed to give to someone else
as an acknowledgement of good HSE
behavior. Apparently it was not a good idea,
at least for the local mentality. Employees
thought it was a joke!
A lack of employee support can easily lead to further
problems with strategy implementation. Unfortu-
nately, endorsement problems are magnified at the
fringes of the organization. Especially when CSR
standards have to be harmonized with outsiders, a
lack of support can have negative effects on the
organization’s ability to realize its objectives. We
obtained the following fragment from a Project
Manager working for one the company’s contrac-
tors:
We: Could you make any recommendations to the
company to further improve its business
practices?
O25: You caught me a little off-guard there.
[Hesitates] If I were the company, I would
have surveyed the employees of contractors
to see whether HSE regulations are really
endorsed at the shop floor level. During joint
meetings we are all nodding our approvals,
but back on the job operational problems
tend to suck me up and I simply cannot find
the time to talk to my people. (...) We could
appoint another safety coordinator, but the
company refuses to pay. I believe that the
company should demand a markup for safer
operations on any contract they sign with
subcontractors. It is a tough market, and we
are forced to enter competitive bids. We have
to undercut our prices to such an extent that
we cannot bring our safety level on par with
that of the company.
In brief, careful planning is needed to gain employee as
well as business partner support of CSR principles, or
else the effectiveness of the approach is bound to suffer.
Legitimacy destruction
The present study reveals that a significant propor-
tion of our respondents fear the threat of legitimacy
destruction, as no less than 10 out of 27 interviewees
referred to this threat in the conversations we had
with them. The following quote derives from the
Executive Vice President for Technology, Portfolio,
& Sustainable Development:
O1: Society at large has no specific perception of us
at all, but rather a generally negative attitude
towards to the sector. In spite of all our HSE
efforts, we still haven’t managed yet to com-
municate with society.
Similar concerns about a generally hostile attitude
towards the petrochemical industry were voiced
during an interview with a New Development
Logistics manager:
O9: Another recent example concerns one of our
truck drivers, who got into a situation where a
car was driving straight toward him on his side
of the road. So the driver had to divert, and he
himself crashed. In the newspapers the whole
thing was reported as ‘yet another accident in
the petrochemical industry,’ whereas the dri-
ver essentially did a good thing by not hitting
the other car.
In short, even substantial investments in CSR
activities do not guarantee a license to operate.
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Especially when companies operate in a contested
industry like petrochemicals, tobacco, or weapons
manufacturing, no feasible level of CSR investment
will ever suffice to shed the negative image that
taints these industries by definition (Heugens,
2002).
Issue ownership
No less than 15 out of our 27 respondents provided
evidence for the existence of issue ownership in the
sense of heightening rather than lowering societal
expectations when making CSR investments. The
following illustration was taken from an interview
with a group-level Health, Safety, and Environment
advisor:
O10: You will always find someone wanting too
much. Greenpeace would like us to stop
emitting mercury in the air. It is part of a
catalyst typically used in oil refineries. In the
past, when we did not yet use that catalyst,
we emitted a lot more SO2. We have now
reduced our SO2 emissions substantively,
but we must substitute this with a slightly
higher level of mercury emissions. Of
course we would also like to reduce our
mercury emissions. We do research to begin
doing so, but Greenpeace is already
complaining.
The dynamics of issue ownership can also be ob-
served from the opposite angle. The following quote
was taken from an interview with one of the
members of a corporate plant’s Neighborhood
Council. The council comprises a platform, a
company’s initiative, in which external stakeholders
who live and work in the proximity of a corporate
plant participate. Through the council, they can
voice their interests and concerns:
O24: One issue that particularly concerns us in-
volves the takeover by foreign firms of plants
located on the company’s factory grounds.
We find it unacceptable when the company
says: ‘‘that factory is no longer ours, the
responsibility for it is out of our hands.’’ That
gives us a sneaky feeling.
We: Why does that give you a ‘‘sneaky feeling’’?
O24: Well, of course those plants will still have to
meet the prevailing environmental legisla-
tions. But if they [the company] say that the
factory is no longer theirs, we worry about
whether all provisions will still be met. Are
they [the new owners] as good or as bad as the
company, is what we then ask ourselves. If they
don’t comply with the law, then that would be
a matter of concern. The neighborhood
council would like the company to give
stricter guarantees concerning the safety of
operations of the plants they sell to outsiders.
Here we see evidence of how a given issue that is no
longer a legal responsibility of a firm can still be
perceived as a source of societal obligations by the
organization’s outside publics.
Poor risk communication
No less than 11 of our 27 interviewees mentioned the
risk of creating societal feelings of anxiety due to the
adoption of CSR measures, especially when organi-
zations fail to communicate the rationale behind
these measures in clear and unambiguous terms. The
following illustration derives from an Issues Manager:
We: How is the dialogue with external stakeholders
organized, regarding the HSE objectives?
R7: The communication with action groups is ra-
ther sparse. And improvement has to come
from both sides, the company and activists. I
recently saw an e-mail sent by Greenpeace,
asking the company to stop working with a list
of products that they believe to be dangerous.
Yet, their view is completely different from
what is accepted in the industry. It actually
resembles a conversation between two people,
who speak different languages and are deaf to
certain sounds!
We: What do external stakeholders expect of the
HSE policy of the company?
O7: What they expect is safety, no harm and no
negative effects. Well, ‘‘expecting’’ has a
double meaning, and this is what they want.
[Emphasizes ‘‘want’’] They basically fear and
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do not trust the chemical industry in general
and the company in particular. They see a risk.
We: Are those expectations realistic?
O7: Yes, they are realistic by definition. Even if
you would be able to scientifically explain that
there is no risk, risk exists in the heads of
people. Risk is equal to hazard [Emphasizes
‘‘hazard’’], which is an engineering measure,
and outrage [Emphasizes ‘‘outrage’’], which is
linked to the public’s perception of risk. In a
group where you have a good dialogue, the
outrage is very small. But often there is no
dialogue whatsoever, and the outrage is
looming around the corner.
One of the specific risks that petrochemical compa-
nies must communicate about is ‘‘flaring.’’ If the
pressure in an oil refinery becomes too high during
the refining process, it must release the excess natural
gas that emerges as a byproduct during the produc-
tion of gasoline. Burning the gas in open air typically
does this. Flaring is in fact a controlled process, and
essentially a safety measure onto itself, but it creates a
frightful spectacle (especially at night) and it makes a
lot of noise. Without proper risk communication,
flaring makes lay people assume that the production
process is out of control and arouses feelings of
anxiety. The following quote by an environmental
technologist comments on this practice:
We: How important is the communication of HSE
objectives to external stakeholders?
R16: It is very important, at least to guarantee you
your license-to-operate. It impacts your total
image, and that in turn helps you recruit the
right people and sell your products. Flaring and
noise are affecting neighbors, as they always
become frightened. Therefore it is important
to communicate in advance when you expect
to flare, so that they do not have to worry. And
the neighbors can also contribute to the
improvement of your communication per-
formance, by saying what they think of it.
In sum, CSR investments only have a reputational
payoff when they are accompanied by professional
communications concerning the risks they are in-
tended to mitigate.
Taming Trojan horses: managerial
mitigation strategies
These two studies illustrate that a variety of orga-
nizational and relational risks can emerge from the
integration of CSR principles in strategic manage-
ment. At first glance, the seven risks seem to emerge
only when CSR activities are not well managed. For
example, risks like diluting managerial attention, bad
strategy implementation, and poor risk communication are
straightforward references to managerial failure.
Upon closer inspection, however, most CSR risks
are unexpected side-effects that are imported when
CSR activities are adopted. Moreover, these risks
were corroborated by a study of an exemplary, high-
performing company that is fully committed to its
ambitious HSE plans. In other words, even well-
managed companies expose themselves to risks when
CSR measures are implemented.
Unfortunately, CSR risks can have a significant
impact on an organization’s ability to reach its
objectives. Organizational risks can seriously disrupt
core organizational transformation processes and
hamper the achievement of internal targets and
objectives. Likewise, relational risks can erode the
organizational license to operate, and damage the
organization’s reputation and perceived external
prestige (cf. Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et
al., 1994). Since these risks pose a severe threat to
corporate competitiveness, we suggest a number of
responses that managers can use to tame them.
Mitigating organizational CSR risks
Diluting managerial attention
The late Edith Penrose, when commenting on the
adoption by corporations of new activities in
general, eloquently described the true nature of the
risk of diluting managerial attention:
‘‘[I]f a firm deliberately or inadvertently expands its
organization more rapidly than the individuals in the
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expanding organization can obtain the experience
with each other and with the firm that is necessary for
the effective operation of the group, the efficiency of
the firm will suffer, even if optimum adjustments are
made in the administrative structure; in extreme cases
this may lead to such disorganization that the firm will
be unable to compete efficiently in the market with
other firms, and a period of ‘stagnation’ may follow’’
(Penrose, 1959: 47). Seen from a perspective that
stresses the experiences that managers have in-house,
the problem of reconciling CSR activities with
ongoing business practices can be reformulated as to
whether or not CSR activities enrich the dynamic
capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece et al.,
1997) of a particular business. Managers can learn from
the demands of stakeholders how their business
activities may be improved and what new capabilities
the organization may need. This learning process is
important, especially since any successful adaptation to
the contemporary business environment requires the
evaluation and renewal of dynamic capabilities. In
short, the problem of diluted managerial attention can
be solved when managers only engage in CSR activ-
ities that do not stray too far from their companies’
current set of dynamic capabilities.
Non-productive spending
The second risk is associated with the inability of
companies to benefit from their investments in
CSR activities. Non-productive spending refers to
investments that do not improve organizational
effectiveness (Khandwalla, 1973). Investments in
CSR activities can contribute to the effectiveness of
a company directly (for example, when a specific
‘‘green’’ product yields positive discounted cash
flows; cf. Porter and van der Linde, 1995) or indi-
rectly (for example, when an organization’s efforts to
upgrade the working conditions in its suppliers’
plants simultaneously improve its corporate reputa-
tion; cf. Waddock, 2002). Hence, a broad set of
criteria ought to be used to evaluate the contribution
of CSR investments to firms’ effectiveness.
More specifically, in order to advocate greater
prudence, we propose the application of (1) clinical,
(2) fiscal, (3) political, and (4) strategic criteria
(Meyer, 1984) for the screening of CSR invest-
ments. The use of clinical criteria implies the evalu-
ation of a given CSR investment in terms of the
benefits it yields for the firm’s stakeholders. The use
of what Meyer (1984) calls fiscal criteria in the
evaluation of CSR activities is perhaps the most
intuitive for managers, as it involves a decision of
allocating capital based on positive discounted cash
flows. The use of political criteria involves an assess-
ment of the extent to which a given investment
advances or retards the interests of the organization’s
dominant coalition (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). The
use of strategic criteria, finally, implies the application
of a crude test to establish whether a given CSR
investment coheres well with competitors’ behavior,
demographic trends, and regulatory policies (Meyer,
1984). In a prescriptive sense, these criteria can be
seen as a progressive set of screens. We use the no-
tion of progressive screens because neither the
dictum that ‘‘all four criteria must apply’’ nor ‘‘any
one criterion alone is sufficient’’ seems reasonable.
The former alternative is too restrictive, as CSR
investments that fail to pass one or two of these
screens may sometimes still be deemed attractive.
The latter is too forgiving, as CSR investments that
fail to pass one or more of the four screens are un-
likely to contribute much to organizational effec-
tiveness.
Stretching the organizational coalition
The third CSR risk refers to broadening the orga-
nization’s dominant coalition beyond a feasible set.
All modern organizations are coalitions of differently
endowed and differently motivated parties (Cyert
and March, 1963). Such differences can be pro-
ductive, as they allow for leveraging intraorganiza-
tional comparative advantages across internal markets
(Jacobides and Croson, 2001). Yet, increasing the
diversity of the organizational coalition becomes
problematic when the parties involved in the process
of decision making become so numerous that con-
sensus becomes difficult or even impossible to ob-
tain. Another problem entails the inability of
companies to distribute value to all stakeholders in
an enlarged coalition (Clarkson, 1995).
Clearly, managers need to be endowed with
authority over residual control rights for various
practical reasons (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It
would be impossible to manage a company if
decisions could only be taken after all involved
stakeholders have given their approval. Besides, it is
logically impossible to satisfy every single stakeholder
demand (Jensen, 2001). However, the notion of
CSR does not dictate that managers hand over the
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responsibility for taking decisions to their stake-
holders, but only that they ought to take into ac-
count the interests of as many constituents as
possible. Hence, effective CSR management urges
managers to integrate the voice of the environment
into their decisions (Heugens et al., 2002) without
giving up their responsibility to direct the company
towards its objectives.
Bad strategy implementation
The fourth risk associated with CSR investments
concerns the problem of bad strategy implementa-
tion. The field of strategic management has tradi-
tionally harbored strong views as to how
corporations should formulate and implement stra-
tegic plans (Andrews, 1971; Chandler, 1962;
Schendel and Hofer, 1979). Strategy making occurs
via a number of interrelated steps, ranging from
internal and external analyses through strategy for-
mulation to strategy implementation. The former
activities have to do with the creation and prioriti-
zation of strategic options, whereas the latter activity
denotes the specific actions that allow the organi-
zation to realize its targeted priorities (Nutt, 1984).
One of the key observations that resulted from our
study is that especially this latter task of strategy
implementation is often neglected when it comes to
CSR activities.
A solution that managers could consider is to
treat CSR activities like any other corporate strat-
egy, and use traditional strategy implementation
tactics in order to manage them successfully (cf.
Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984). Nutt (1987) has
presented a fourfold typology of such tactics, which
seems applicable to the problem at hand. Managers
can first of all use intervention tactics. These begin
by creating a perceived need for CSR involvement
in the minds of key decision makers, for example
by tying it to desired goals (Dutton et al., 2001).
Second, managers may also resort to using partici-
pation tactics, which would allow their peers to
adapt the CSR proposal by making suggestions and
amendments. This tactic creates involvement.
Third, persuasion tactics can be adopted, in which
case the development of the CSR plan is delegated
to an internal or external expert. It is then left up
to the expert to develop and present the CSR plan,
and to argue for its adoption. Implementation by
edict, finally, occurs when managers resort to using
their power and authority when implementing
CSR plans. This last tactic requires a manager to
announce a CSR plan, and prescribe the expected
behavior using a memorandum, formal presenta-
tion, or on-the-job instruction (Nutt, 1987).
Mitigating relational CSR risks
Legitimacy destruction
The first relational risk we identified is that the
adoption of CSR activities can be perceived as an act
of window dressing by one or several of its external
stakeholders, so that the costly activity of choice does
not lead to a legitimacy surplus, but in fact to
legitimacy destruction. Rather than safeguarding
their license to operate, companies may actually risk
their societal mandate by engaging in CSR activities,
especially if one or several key stakeholders regard
these as insincere.
Framed this way, the core question becomes
how to establish the sincerity of CSR efforts. The
managers of our case study organization were rather
keenly aware of the risk of legitimacy destruction,
and they had taken a number of related measures to
protect their organization against it. First, they
formulated so-called ‘‘Key Performance Indicators’’
(KPIs) – quantifiable measures for core organiza-
tional processes, established well in advance of a
given operational period, that help to evaluate post
hoc the organization’s CSR performance over that
period. KPIs were typically established after sub-
stantial stakeholder consultation. Second, they used
these KPIs to set the terms of the public debate
surrounding the organization’s CSR performance
by communicating largely in these terms. Third,
they sought external endorsement and verification
of its performance on these terms, mostly by
trustworthy and highly reputed outsiders, in this
case two world-renowned auditing firms. This
third-person perspective helped to establish the
sincerity of the firm’s efforts and the effectiveness of
its performance. The value of this three-pronged
procedure is twofold. On the one hand, the stip-
ulation of KPIs has set goals for the company to
reach and be accountable for. On the other, the
external verification of the company’s social per-
formance helped to alleviate accusations of insin-
cerity and foul play.
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Issue ownership
Investments in CSR activities generate additional
stakeholder expectations with respect to the
responsibility of an organization to resolve societal
issues (cf. Heugens et al., 2004: 1362). Issue owner-
ship can be particularly frustrating when a company is
already contributing with everything it can, and yet is
supposed to do even more. This risk is problematic
for the competitiveness of organizations in two cases:
(1) when issue ownership begins to absorb organi-
zational resource endowments to the extent that
companies can no longer invest in the improvement
of their organizational effectiveness, and (2) when
competitors are systematically adopting a free-rider
strategy with respect to this issue.
The first threat implies that a company cannot live
up to the increased expectations because this would
damage its competitiveness. However, this can be
easily perceived as an excuse for unwillingness to
invest in the solution of social problems. A solution
to such misperceptions could reside in sincere
stakeholder involvement, such that corporate con-
stituents are given the opportunity to judge for
themselves whether there is willingness on behalf of
the organization to solve social problems. In many
cases consultations can diminish information asym-
metries and initial misperceptions.
The second threat implies that while one orga-
nization is investing in a solution to social issues, its
competitors gain additional incentives to systemati-
cally avoid such investments. Especially large mul-
tinational companies tend to end up contributing
more than their share, not because smaller compa-
nies cannot (proportionately) contribute but rather
because of the visibility of multinationals. However,
social issues are most effectively solved by means of
collective action. The more companies in one
industry contribute, the more likely it is that an issue
will be resolved. Therefore, the initiation of industry
platforms and roundtables can contribute to the
effective solution of issues, not just because of their
ability to produce concerted action but also because
of their contribution to peer-monitoring through
the enactment of a jointly perceived ‘‘shadow of the
future’’ (Axelrod, 1984).
Poor risk communication
Finally, organizations can incur lasting damage to
their reputations when they do not understand or
ignore the perils of poor risk communication (Alsop,
2004). ‘‘Risk’’ refers to the perceived probability of
harm in a given situation, as determined by the
perceived nature of a given hazard and the perceived
extent of one’s exposure to that hazard. Risk com-
munication, then, is the process of exchanges about
how best to assess and manage such risks among
regulatory practitioners, interest groups, the general
public, and sometimes academics and opinion lead-
ers (cf. Powell and Leiss, 1997: 33). Professional risk
communication adequately informs a public when it
is exposed to a given risk, and comforts or soothes a
potentially worried audience when no substantial
risks exist.
This view on professional risk communication
entails that there are two regularly occurring perils.
First, a given organization may fail to convey to a
certain public that its members are exposing them-
selves to a risk. Especially when the organization is in
such a position that it should be in the knowing, the
reputational risk associated with such a lack of
communication can be substantial once an organi-
zation’s audiences eventually do find out that they
have been ignored or even misled. Second, due to its
communications (or the lack thereof), an organiza-
tion may arouse certain worries or fears in an audi-
ence, when the underlying risk they worry about is
in effect very small or even negligible. In the present
study, this second peril of risk communication is
aptly illustrated by the example of flaring.
How then should companies avoid the perils of
risk communication, so that they do not trivialize
concrete hazards and simultaneously do not over
exaggerate rather mundane risks? One issue on
which professional and scholarly opinions converge
(Alsop, 2004; Grunig, 1992; Powell and Leiss, 1997)
is that organizations should seek continuing con-
nections with their outside audiences on both a ra-
tional and an emotional level. At the rational level, it
is important to have one’s facts straight, to be able to
provide clear-cut crisis scenarios, and to communi-
cate about scientific assessments of risk. But issues
management battles are seldom decided in the minds
of an external audience alone. One must also win –
or at least speak to – the heart. In less popularizing
terms, the corporate message must have a rational as
well as an emotional carrier. Regardless of the
importance of having a rationally compelling mes-
sage, it is at least equally important to be able to
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show how a company’s CSR attempts contribute to
issues or parties that matter to the organization’s
publics at the emotional level. If a company’s loses
touch with one or several of its key audiences at
either the rational or the emotional level, the like-
lihood increases that existing risks become trivialized
or that non-existing hazards begin to play a signifi-
cant role in stakeholders’ decision-making.
Conclusion
When urging companies to adopt CSR activities, we
also need to advise them about the likely effect of
CSR investments on overall business performance.
In this paper, we have framed CSR activities as a
Trojan horse and identified seven commonly
occurring CSR risks, of which four principally play
out at the level of the organization and three others
at the level of the interorganizational relationship.
We urge managers to implement CSR activities
with care, and to always use a portfolio of mitigation
strategies. Our findings suggest that CSR involve-
ment is not an innocent activity, and that experi-
menting with it in the hope to contribute to the
social good or to gain standing in the eyes of others
can be dangerous for the competitiveness of business
organizations.
Notes
1 ‘‘E1’’ denotes ‘‘Expert 1.’’ Hence, the quote cited
here is derived from an interview with the first expert
we interviewed.
2 ‘‘O3’’ denotes ‘‘Organization Member 3.’’ Hence,
the quote cited here is derived from an interview with
the third organization member we interviewed. Note
that interviewees 23 to 27 are external stakeholders, so
in those cases ‘‘O’’ stands for ‘‘Organizational External
Stakeholder’’.
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